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Ombudsmen Models

There are numerous types of Ombudsmen, with widely varying tasks and authorities. Although not an exact science, generally Ombudsmen are divided into two groups; classical and organizational, though there is constant evolution within each group, and the demarcation lines between each are changing rapidly. Further, there are several different species of Organizational Ombudsmen, such as military or specialty Ombudsmen. Many Organizational Ombudsmen are vested with considerable power, albeit they do not report to a legislative body. For our purposes, I have divided the models into two broad categories, civilian Ombudsmen and military Ombudsmen, and then into respective classical and organizational sub-categories.

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Classical Ombudsmen


The tradition of a person responsible for receiving complaints against the administrative actions of government, investigating them and recommending appropriate solutions if warranted is a long one, with its roots in Africa and Scandinavia. The idea has evolved into the concept of the classical Ombudsman.

According to materials published by The Ombudsmen’s Association (TOA), a U.S.-based umbrella body for a proportion of Organizational Ombudsmen, classical Ombudsmen possess the following characteristics:

  • function is created by law;
  • appointed by legislative bodies;
  • power to do formal investigations;
  • subpoena power;
  • strong legal safeguards for their independence and the confidentiality of records;
  • publish public reports42.

All Canadian provinces, with the exceptions of Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island, have a provincial Ombudsman. Several have been established for decades. They share the traditional characteristics of a classical Ombudsman’s office, including legislated mandates, formal statutory powers and reporting procedures. Provincial Ombudsmen normally have jurisdiction to examine any aspect of governmental administration, with very few exceptions. They possess the power to recommend, but cannot mandate the implementation of any recommendations.

There is currently no federal government classical Ombudsman of general jurisdiction. The concept was examined in a 1977 study and report43, ordered by the then Prime Minister and conducted by a team of Deputy Ministers, which recommended the adoption of a classical type Ombudsman’s office for the federal Government. It was recommended that the office also cover the Department of National Defence. The bill, which was subsequently introduced by the government, did not pass in Parliament before the session was dissolved44.

Auditor General

The Auditor General of Canada is governed by the Auditor General Act, reports annually to the Speaker of the House of Commons, and can issue a special report on any pressing or urgent issue. He has a mandate to inquire into and report on any matter relating to the financial affairs of Canada or public property. He has extensive investigative powers, and may exercise all powers of a Commissioner under Part I of the Inquiries Act.

Privacy Commissioner

The office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada has a mandate to investigate complaints made under the Privacy Act. He has strong investigative powers, including the power to subpoena and hear evidence under oath. The Commissioner reports to the Speaker of the House of Commons.

Information Commissioner

The office of the Information Commissioner of Canada has a mandate to investigate any complaint where it is alleged that government has denied rights under the Access to Information Act. He has virtually identical powers and reporting procedures as the Privacy Commissioner.

Official Languages Commissioner

The Official Languages Commissioner describes himself as Canada’s language Ombudsman. He has a mandate to investigate complaints under the Official Languages Act and reports to the Speaker of the House of Commons. He has wide-ranging investigative powers and makes recommendations based on his findings.45

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Organizational Ombudsmen

There are several types of Organizational Ombudsmen. Some are empowered, some are not.

Unempowered Ombudsmen

The Ombudsman Association (TOA) Organizational Ombudsmen model is the model that is cited most often in internal DND/CF documents as a possible template for my Office.

TOA-style Organizational Ombudsmen have somewhat different features to those of classical Ombudsmen, as well as many other Organizational Ombudsmen. These features are as follows:

  • employee of the organization;
  • confidential;
  • designated neutral;
  • communications channel;
  • complaint handler;
  • dispute resolver;
  • change maker.46

Typical functions often, but not always, ascribed to a TOA-type Organizational Ombudsman’s office include:

  • listening/venting;
  • providing information;
  • reframing issues/developing options;
  • referring;
  • advice/coaching;
  • looking into a problem;
  • formal mediation;
  • propose changes to policies and practices;
  • monitoring and upward referral of trends.47

These are the characteristics of the lowest level, “softest”48 type of Ombudsmanry. They were published in a pamphlet entitled “Options, Functions and Skills: What an Organizational Ombudsperson Might Want to Know”,49 by Dr. Mary Rowe, TOA co-founder and former president, and currently the Ombudsperson at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).

TOA Ombudsmen are normally employees of corporations, or, in the US, of universities. Indeed, the TOA was originally called the Corporate Ombudsman Association. It changed its name to TOA in 1992. The essence of the TOA-style Organizational Ombudsmen approach is helping the complainant help him or herself come up with solutions to their work related problems. TOA Ombudsmen do not normally ascertain the facts relating to an issue, nor do they normally present formal recommendations to decision-makers. The approach is typified in a quote from the Ombudsperson at Harvard Medical School, speaking at a TOA training session in October 1998. She gave the scenario of a person who comes to her having just lost his or her job. Her approach was to listen, allow the person to vent, and offer options, but, at the end of the day, the person “just wanted a hug”.50

Other TOA Ombudsmen were quite frank about one of the reasons they exist – to mitigate corporate liability. In the United States, corporate Ombudsmen are increasingly being promoted as an example of a corporations desire to do the right thing. This may go some way to reduce fines where corporations are found liable in court.51


Private Sector

The Toronto Dominion Bank “Between Us” model

The Toronto Dominion (TD) Bank "Between Us” programme, is the specific one occasionally cited in internal DND/CF materials as a template for my Office.52 The programme began in 1977 and has a mandate to informally resolve internal work-related complaints from members of staff. It attempts to do so by low level negotiation, coaching, education and assisting the complainant to develop options. It does not have any formal or even informal powers. Roughly half its calls are requests for information or interpretation of policies. All calls are treated confidentially, and staff members do everything they can to protect the identity of the complainant. All notes are shredded after three months. The staff is comprised of four employees and a mid-level manager who reports to a Senior Vice President of Human Resources, usually once every month. The “Between Us” office does not investigate complaints, nor does it attempt to establish any of the facts of a particular case. It dispenses advice, shreds any documents taken during meetings, and has no formal follow up procedures, resulting in a self-acknowledged difficulty measuring its effectiveness. 53

Bank of Nova Scotia Ombudsman

The Bank of Nova Scotia has four Ombudsmen who work mainly from their homes and deal with internal work-related issues. They do not keep records and any case notes are shredded once a case is concluded. They do not meet with people who call them. They do not investigate or mediate. The Bank of Nova Scotia Human Resources Manual advises employees that the Ombudsman's office can: listen, provide information, identify options, help you to help yourself, refer you to the right person and obtain information for you.54 They accept anonymous calls and, in fact, have no way of knowing if callers are even employed by the bank. They have no formal powers. Typical problems they deal with include performance appraisal disputes, employee - manager disputes and disagreements over short and long term sickness entitlements.55

Hydro Québec Ombudsman

The Hydro Québec Ombudsman describes herself as “a corporate Ombudsman”. She reports to the Chair of the Board of Directors but has no formal powers. She agrees that credibility is the cornerstone of a successful Ombudsman’s office. She does not keep records and has no formal tools to measure the success of her office. Recently, she retained outside counsel who were successful in enabling her to avoid being compelled to give evidence in court concerning a matter she had dealt with.

Public Sector

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Ombudsman

We met with the Organizational Ombudsman at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). 

DFAIT has had an Ombudsman in place since the early 1990’s. The incumbent works alone and receives about two hundred calls per year, of which “ten percent are serious”. She states she destroys all her notes because she is subject to the Access to Information Act and wishes to do her utmost to protect confidentiality. She advises this is not conducive to her ability to do her job. She has no formal powers. In an interview, she pointed out that the DND/CF Ombudsman would need to be “muscular”, which she defined as having the ability to go to people to get answers and co-operation, and “should have more authority than the average Ombudsman”. She saw a clear distinction between the model she worked under to that she envisioned being effective for the DND/CF, which she described as “a totally different animal”. She also advised that "it is important you have teeth.56

Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development

We also met with the Ombudsman at the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND). She reports directly to the Deputy Minister. She has no investigative powers and “does not participate in a fact-finding exercise” in any of the two hundred or so cases she deals with each year. She concentrates on mediation at an early stage, adopting non-threatening, non-confrontational approaches. She does not write reports, nor does she keep records.

Canadian International Development Agency

The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) conducted a 15-month TOA-type Organizational Ombudsman pilot project, that ended in May 1998. The office received 59 “contacts” during the course of the project.57 As a result of an employee survey, CIDA decided to set up a permanent Ombudsman’s office, which will re-open in January 1999. The CIDA office will be similarly structured to those of DFAIT and DIAND. The Ombudsman will concentrate on mediation, and not keep files nor take notes.

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Empowered Organizational Ombudsmen

Over the last few years a schism has developed between TOA-style Organizational Ombudsmen and a wide variety of Organizational Ombudsmen from various fields who feel that they need investigative powers to do their job properly.58 They have been created to meet the specific needs of the organization, and their terms of reference and powers are tailored to that end. They also serve the function of acting as an alternative to traditional litigation. These modes are not “classical” Ombudsmen as defined above by the TOA. They are not set up by legislation, nor do they enjoy strong legal safeguards guaranteeing their autonomy. They do not report to a legislative body. They come from the educational, media and, increasingly, the corporate fields. They report directly to the organization that employs them, attempt to resolve issues informally if possible, but have the capacity to investigate and make recommendations if necessary. They are vested with considerable power and authority, and there is clearly a correlation between their ability to ascertain the facts and their credibility within their fields.59 We studied several such empowered models, including several from the private sector.


Concordia University Ombudsman

The Concordia University Ombudsman has held this position for twenty years. She has the power to investigate and make recommendations directly to the Rector of the University. She deals with systemic and individual issues. She states that while she does not often use her investigative powers, the fact they exist are essential in establishing her credibility and in resolving issues. She resolves the vast majority of her cases by mediation and negotiation, but there are a percentage of cases where she states, “[…] there is no substitute for an investigation.” She has well defined terms of reference that give her the authority to:

Conduct an independent and objective inquiry into complaints where normal channels of recourse have been exhausted. 60

She also enjoys strong investigative powers. Her terms of reference include the provision that she has:

Immediate access to such University records, reports or documents as are required to fulfil (her) functions. Requests for such access shall receive priority from all members.61

She does not differentiate between formal and informal investigations, and has no formal limits on her ability to intervene. 62 She is of the opinion that the authority to investigate is an essential pre-requisite of any person using the name Ombudsman.

Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Ombudsman

The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) Ombudsman is another example of an empowered Organizational Ombudsman. 63 He thoroughly investigates complaints about programmes from both public and internal sources, but does not begin his investigation until all other avenues are exhausted. He reports directly to the CBC President and Board of Directors. He has unlimited latitude to independently investigate issues that have not been resolved by other means, and sees this ability as fundamental to his effectiveness and credibility. In an interview with a member of my staff, he advised that:

The power of the Ombudsman is directly related to the credibility of his findings. The investigations must be able to withstand scrutiny from all stakeholders. They must be painstaking and detailed. They cannot be flawed or incomplete. You couldn’t do this work without an investigative capacity.64

Mr. Bazay advises that to do his job he requires, and receives, complete access to people and documents within the CBC. He has the capacity to self-initiate investigations and can, and does, retain outside experts to assist him in his investigations, particularly in instances where the investigation involves technical knowledge outside of his area of expertise. It is some indication of the outside credibility of his office that the Prime Minister’s Office recently requested he investigate aspects of the CBC’s coverage of the Asian Pacific Economic Conference (APEC) story.

Magna International Ombudsman

At Magna International, a large auto-parts manufacturer based in Ontario, three of the four Ombudsmen staff function as investigators, making recommendations to management on problem resolution. 65

Toronto Star Ombud

The Toronto Star Ombud, who reports directly to the Publisher of the newspaper, has access to all people and documents within the organization. He can launch investigations on his own volition or as the result of a complaint from any person. He has the executive authority to direct the paper to publish a correction if he determines it justified.66 He has a weekly column on the editorial page of the newspaper, in which he may deal with cases he has investigated.

Canadian Banking Ombudsman

The Canadian Banking Ombudsman deals with customer complaints that have not been resolved by member institutions. He reports to a board of six independent directors, but does not solicit their advice, nor report to them on specific complaints. The Ombudsman’s decision is final. There is no appeal to the board, nor “can the board exert influence on the Ombudsman’s recommendations.”67 He has the power to investigate any matter brought to him, and prides himself on the professionalism of his investigations. He notes that:

By design, the investigation of complaints is not a rigidly structured process. Some complaints are resolved in an informal way. In cases where the facts are clear, the customer and the bank may be brought together for a meeting to clarify the issues of the dispute and, hopefully, resolve the problem. Complaints in which there are differences of opinion over facts may require a detailed investigation.68

Toronto Dominion Bank Ombudsman

In addition to the TD Bank “Between Us” programme, the TD bank does, in fact, have an Organizational Ombudsman, whose mandate is to deal with external complaints involving the bank and its customers. The TD Ombudsman reports directly to the President and Board of Directors and has the ability to investigate complaints and recommend solutions. 69

Algonquin College Ombudsman

Even some relatively smaller scale organizations empower their Ombudsmen. For example, Algonquin College, a community college in Ottawa, has an Ombudsman who deals primarily with student issues. He conducts investigations, as indeed does almost every other academic Ombudsman in Canada.70

Office of the Correctional Investigator

During my consultations, it was suggested that I examine the model used by the federal office of the Correctional Investigator. Like my Office, the Correctional Investigator’s office is unique in that it operates as a specialty Ombudsman, over-seeing the activities of a specific government organization (Correctional Services Canada) and dealing with the problems of a particular group of persons within a unique context and culture; while reporting directly to a Minister.

The office of the Correctional Investigator was established on June 7, 1973, as an independent avenue of redress for inmate complaints. The Correctional Investigator was initially appointed as a Commissioner pursuant to Part II of the Inquiries Act with a mandate to investigate on her own initiative or on complaint from or on behalf of inmates and to report upon problems of inmates that came within the responsibility of the Solicitor General. The appointment of the investigator under the Inquiries Act allowed for an opportunity to accord formal powers to the Correctional Investigator, while at the same time allowing the government the opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of the office before it became encased in legislation.71

The office was formally encased in legislation on November 1, 1992, with the enactment of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act (CCRA). 72 Although the CCRA did not significantly alter the authority or the role of the office, it did “clearly establish the function of the Correctional Investigator as that of an Ombudsman and clarify the authority and responsibility of the office within a well defined legislative framework”.73

The provisions of Part III of the CCRA, which establish the operating framework for the Correctional Investigator’s office, parallel very closely those of Provincial Ombudsman statutes. 74 Although the Correctional Investigator has all of the powers of a “classical” Ombudsman, he is not “classical” in the true sense of the word, as he does not report directly to the House of Commons. The Correctional Investigator reports directly to the Solicitor General. His budget is set by the Solicitor General and not independently through Treasury Board. The annual and special reports of the Correctional Investigator must however be presented to Parliament by the Solicitor General on any of the first 30 days after it is received and on which the House is sitting.75

The fact that the Correctional Investigator does not report directly to Parliament but must go through the Solicitor General, who has the responsibility for Corrections, has been a source of much debate and contention. During the public consultations leading up to the finalization of the CCRA many parties, including the office itself, advocated for a direct reporting to Parliament.76

Under the CCRA, the Correctional Investigator is appointed for a term of five years, subject to “good behaviour”. The mandate of the Correctional Investigator is detailed in section 167(1) of the CCRA which reads:

To conduct investigations into the problems of offenders related to decisions, recommendations, acts or omissions of the Commissioner (of Corrections) or any person under the control and management of, or performing services for or on behalf of, the Commissioner, that affect offenders either individually or as a group.77

The office receives about 6,500 complaints during the course of a year and staff spend approximately 350 days in federal penitentiaries and can conduct in excess of 2,000 interviews with inmates and about 1,000 interviews with institutional and regional staff. 78 The Correctional Investigator has full discretion as to whether an investigation should be conducted, how it is to be carried out and whether an investigation should be terminated. In practice, the office recommends to inmates that they try to resolve problems through internal redress processes first but this is not a precondition to their involvement. The Correctional Investigator may exercise his discretion to become involved at the first instance if it is determined that the offender will not or can not reasonably address the area of complaint through the internal redress process or the area of complaint is already under review with the Correctional Service.79

Under the CCRA, the Correctional Investigator has broad powers of investigation including:

  • considerable authority to access information and documents;
  • the right to enter government premises for inspections or inquiries; and
  • the right to hold hearings under oath.80

Recourse to the use of formal powers, however, is not always necessary and the office tries to focus on addressing problems at the level of the complainant and the staff through discussion and negotiation. 81

The Correctional Investigator’s office has also had the unique opportunity and benefit of an outside review of the office’s effectiveness, as part of the recent legislative five-year review to the CCRA.82 Many of those consulted as part of this review felt that the office is understaffed and under-funded and that staff are located far from the institutions and are only able to get to each institution infrequently. It was recommended, as part of this review, that the office be given greater resources. The report also noted that some offenders argued that the Investigator was not solving their problems and criticized the fact that the Investigator was paid for by the same system they were grieving. It was suggested by some that the Investigator should be outside of the Ministry of Solicitor General Canada. Indeed, some respondents suggested that the current legislative enactment of the Correctional Investigator’s powers under the CCRA was not sufficient and that the Investigator’s function should be enshrined in its own statute and the office should report directly to Parliament. Some participants in the review went so far as to suggest that the Correctional Investigator have the authority to implement its own recommendations.

There was some indication however that the Correctional Investigator’s office has had a positive effect on corrections. Some inmates felt that since 1990 they have had less of a need to access the office as more issues are being resolved faster and at the lowest grievance level. It was also noted that in some cases, simply mentioning the possibility of involving the Correctional Investigator helps to get the issue resolved. This effect demonstrates how even the presence of an effective and credible Organizational Ombudsman can serve to ensure that injustice and unfairness are prevented or remedied quickly.

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Obviously, the most relevant Ombudsman’s models for our purposes are those of the armed forces of other nations. Several have had Ombudsmen or their equivalent in place for decades. We examined various models, including the Australian, Norwegian, Swedish, American and German military Ombudsmen, who report directly to their respective legislatures. We concentrated on the Israeli and Netherlands models, as both report via their respective Ministers of Defence and both have a mandate to deal with systemic and individual injustices, and therefore most closely reflect that mandate conferred to me.

Classical Ombudsmen
United States Inspector General

The United States has had an Inspector General system for over 200 years. The Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) has a mandate to “conduct objective and independent audits, investigations, evaluations and other activities to prevent, detect and help correct problems in DoD programmes and to identify opportunities for improving efficiency and effectiveness”.83 The DoD Inspector General is staffed entirely by civilians and the IG reports directly to Congress. She monitors and coordinates the work of the military IG’s, and has the authority to establish policies for them.84

DoD IG will investigate serious cases and cases involving high-ranking officers and officials,85 as well as allegations of reprisals or retaliation against whistleblowers anywhere in the armed services.86 They receive approximately 16,000 calls per year, of which 2,000 to 2,500 are investigated.

The US Army also has an IG system, which operates in tandem with the chain of command. IG’s are appointed to each base and command, and in turn report to an independent IG, who is normally a three-star general. He or she in turn reports to the Secretary of the Army. The local IG’s have a reporting relationship with their base commanders.

IG’s have a responsibility to inquire into and report on the discipline, efficiency, morale, training and readiness of the Army. Anyone may submit a complaint, allegation or request for assistance to any Army IG concerning matters of Army interest. IG’s normally encourage members to discuss issues with the chain of command in the first instance, but this is not mandatory, unless other specific mechanisms are available. The mandate includes systemic issues, educating members in processes and procedures, and identifying responsibility for corrective action. Common requests for assistance are similar to those that have been forwarded to my Office to date; including non-support of family members, reprisals/whistleblowing,87 and pay. The IG’s have very wide powers of investigation. 88

Parliamentary Commissioner for the German Armed Forces

Germany has had a Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces since 1959.89 He or she reports directly to Parliament and has a mandate:

[…] to take action should circumstances come to his attention which suggest a violation of the basic rights of service personnel or the principles of Innere Fuhrung (a concept of leadership and civilian education that seeks to combine the demands of the military mission of the armed forces with the dignity and rights of service personnel as citizens of a democratic state).90

The Parliamentary Commissioner’s mandate does not extend to civilian German Armed Forces' employees. She may self-initiate investigations and has the discretion to investigate any matter brought to her attention; and must investigate when instructed by the Bundestag or Defence Committee. She has extensive powers of investigation, including the power to require the Federal Minister of Defence and his or her employees to answer her queries, as well as afford her access to their files. All federal, state and local government authorities are required to assist the Commissioner in conducting the necessary investigations. The Commissioner may enter any German Armed Forces premises without notice. She may “give the competent authorities an opportunity to settle a matter”.91

The Commissioner may make recommendations at the appropriate level to resolve a complaint. The recommendations are not binding, but “carry considerable weight and are not easily ignored or evaded by defence agencies”.92

A member of my staff met with the Federal Republic of Germany Defence Attaché in Ottawa. The Attaché is a strong supporter of the Parliamentary Commissioner system, noting that the Commissioner is very powerful, has virtually free rein to determine when, where and how she conducts her investigations and reports quickly. Normally, most investigations are completed within two months. He has had dealings with the Commissioner, and believes that the system works for the benefit of all concerned.

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Australian Defence Force Ombudsman

The Australian Defence Force Ombudsman (DFO) is part of the Commonwealth Ombudsman, whose mandate includes a wide range of public sector administrative organs, including the Federal Police and Tax Office.93 The Commonwealth Ombudsman’s Act was amended to add the DFO in 1983.

The DFO may investigate matters of administration related to the service of a current or former member of the Australian Defence Force (ADF), or matters that arise as a consequence of a person serving in the ADF. The mandate extends to dependants of members or ex-members in respect of service related allowances, pensions or other benefits. The DFO has discretion as to whether or not to investigate a complaint. The DFO may not investigate action taken in connection with proceedings taken against a member for an offence under the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982, or in respect of the grant or refusal to grant an honour or an award to a member.

The DFO will not investigate cases where the member is entitled to seek redress under existing regulations and has not done so, unless the DFO is of the opinion special circumstances exist. The ADF informs members seeking redress about their right to approach the DFO if they are not satisfied with the outcome or timeliness of the internal redress procedures offered by the Defence Force. The Commonwealth Ombudsman in his 1997-98 Annual Report notes that:

Delays in the redress process continue to be the basis of a significant number of complaints to my Office. The CRA (Complaint Resolution Agency) is working with us to explore ways to improve the effectiveness and the timeliness of the redress system. 94

ADF members can contact the DFO directly. The DFO also has the power to investigate both individual and systemic issues and to initiate an investigation on its own motion or at the request of the Chief of Defence Force. For example, in January 1998 the Ombudsman and the Vice Chief of the Defence Force jointly released a public report on systemic issues entitled “Own Motion Investigation Into How the Australian Defence Force Responds to Allegations of Serious Incidents and Offences.” The investigation behind the report was begun at the request of the Chief of Defence Force, as a result of an incident at an Air Force Base. As the investigation unfolded it took on two aspects:

Firstly, to identify and report on systemic issues arising from the way the Australian Defence Force responded to serious incidents and offences, particularly sexual offences. And secondly, the Ombudsman was investigating specific issues related to how the case was handled. 95

In response to the DFO’s recommendations, the ADF took actions which included developing a comprehensive draft investigations manual for commanding officers and investigating officers and considering a tri-service training approach for investigating officers.

The DFO has considerable powers of investigation. He or she is empowered by the Ombudsman’s Act to conduct investigations in such a manner as the Ombudsman thinks fit, and is subject to few restrictions. The DFO has many of the powers of a Royal Commission, including the power to examine witnesses under oath. He or she has access to all relevant documents.96

However, the DFO rarely has to resort to using his or her formal powers. The Ombudsman’s investigations “are almost always conducted on the basis of voluntary co-operation on the part of the agencies and individuals”.97 For example, the ADF has issued a directive to all officers that they do not require a formal notice under section 9 of the Ombudsman’s Act to produce documents. Such a formal notice to require production of documents is required however where the DFO seeks to get documents or files from other agencies outside of the ADF. 98

In many cases, the DFO’s investigation does not go beyond reviewing the relevant documentation, however, ADF procedures make it very clear that the DFO has the capacity to complete extensive investigations if necessary. The following are extracts from a document prepared by the ADF outlining the relationship between the ADF and the DFO, and how ADF members will cooperate with the DFO:

The Ombudsman may investigate complaints by oral enquiry, by written request for comment, by examination of the files, by formal interview of relevant officers (sometimes under oath), or by combinations of these methods. The Ombudsman Act provide that investigations shall be conducted in such manner as the Ombudsman thinks fit, and the Ombudsman’s officers may make direct inquiry to Service units or to individual members if and when considered necessary. 99

Inquiries generated by the Ombudsman have high priority, with a timeline of twenty days to provide a substantive reply. At the request of the Ombudsman any contemplated executive action relating to a complaint (for example, posting, recovery of overpayment) may be suspended until the Ombudsman completes the investigation. 100

There are no military personnel involved in the DFO’s reviews, though the Ombudsman may delegate investigations to ADF personnel to complete under his or her supervision.

The Ombudsman may make recommendations for appropriate remedy to the appropriate agency. A copy is provided to the Minister of Defence. If appropriate action is not taken within a reasonable time the Ombudsman may report the matter to the Prime Minister and to Parliament. 101 If the Ombudsman’s report includes express or implied criticism of a person or agency, then the Ombudsman must give that person or agency an opportunity to make submissions regarding the report. Normally, the Ombudsman will make available a draft of the document to the person or agency for comment prior to finalization.

Interestingly, there are numerous and striking similarities between the Australian Defence Force and the Canadian Forces. Both have approximately 60,000 serving members dispersed over a large geographical area, as well as overseas. Both have a budget of approximately $9 billion.102 Both have many traditions and practices rooted in the British armed services. Many of the complaints and issues dealt with by the ADF Ombudsman correspond closely to those that my Office anticipates receiving.

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Norwegian Ombudsman for the Armed Forces

The Norwegian Armed Forces Ombudsman has a mandate to “ensure that no-one suffers injustice while serving in the Armed Forces”. 103 He or she has the power to investigate any matter to determine if an injustice has been done, and if so, “to see to it that corrective action is taken”.104

The Ombudsman may investigate, at his or her discretion, any case submitted to him or her by an individual, their next-of-kin, or by a committee of service personnel representatives where a case has been settled by them. He or she also acts as an adviser to all persons who are eligible for military service.

When the Ombudsman takes up a case, he or she initially refers it to the involved unit for a response. The Ombudsman is “empowered to deal with cases involving all authorities. He has access to all documents and information at every level of the Armed Force, unless security conditions render this impossible”.105

The Ombudsman will take into account the interests of the complainant and the Armed Forces when formulating any recommendations. Once the recommendations are made “it is presumed throughout that the recommendations of the Ombudsman be implemented”.

Further, “the Minister of Defence and the Storting (The Norwegian national legislature) may require the Ombudsman to give an opinion on matters within his sphere of competence.”106

Swedish Ombudsman

The Swedish Armed Forces have access to the Parliamentary Ombudsman, once military grievance mechanisms are exhausted. The Parliamentary Ombudsman “can visit units of the armed forces at any time to investigate complaints or just to talk to conscripts.” 107 On average, the Parliamentary Ombudsman deals with approximately ten cases per year originating from the military.

Organizational Ombudsmen
Czech Republic Armed Forces Ombudsman

The Czech Republic Armed Forces has an Ombudsman-like institution. The incumbent is a civilian with a legal background. He advised me that he reports to the Minister of Defence and that he has considerable investigative powers into matters of Human Rights and Freedoms for past and present members of the Czech Republic Armed Forces and their dependents. 108

Netherlands Armed Forces Inspector General

Although officially called the Inspector General of the Armed Forces, the Netherlands Inspector General has many features similar with my Office, and, indeed, his literature speaks of his Ombudsman function. 109 His task, in his own words, is to act as “a barometer, horsefly, oilcan and safety valve”.110 He works outside the chain of command and reports directly to the Minister of Defence. The office has been in existence since the end of the Second World War. He has a mandate to:

Inform and make recommendations to (the) Minister on request or on his own initiative, on matters relating to the Armed Forces, in addition to instituting investigations into, or fulfilling the role of mediator and adjudicator, in matters relating to individual Armed Forces personnel or former personnel, these being submitted to him in writing by, or on behalf of, the person in question or his next of kin. 111

His functions include giving advice, mediating at later stages in proceedings, networking and bringing any problems to the attention of those who can solve them. The two fundamentals of his office are independence and confidentiality.

The Inspector General has wide ranging investigative powers, including the right to access any place or document belonging to the Armed Forces, as well as the power to summon any Armed Forces personnel to a hearing. He deals with approximately five hundred cases per annum.

Israeli Defence Force Soldiers' Complaints Commissioner

The Israeli Defence Force (IDF) has had a Soldiers' Complaints Commissioner since 1972. 112 He or she is appointed by the Minister of Defence, in consultation with the Minister of Justice and with the approval of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee of the Knesset. 113 He or she has a mandate to investigate any act, if that act is:

  • directly injurious to, or directly withholds, a benefit from the aggrieved soldier;
  • relates to the rules and regulations of the service, the conditions of the service, or discipline;
  • contrary to any enactment or to army orders, or is done without lawful authority, or is contrary to sound administration, or involves an excessively inflexible attitude or flagrant injustice.

In short, the Soldiers' Complaints Commissioner investigates alleged or apparent systemic and individual injustices. He or she possesses extensive investigative powers, including immediate, real time access to the entire IDF personnel records computer system, which he advises are essential in order to get the job done quickly.114

The incumbent travels extensively and meets frequently with troops and commanders. This results in him being able “to head off many problems before they become complaints”.115

He receives between 8,000 and 9,000 complaints per annum, and deals with 84 percent of them within two months of notification. 116 His investigations involve getting all sides of the story, though he is not bound by procedural law or the rules of evidence. He works collegially with the chain of command. He recently reported that roughly 60 percent of complaints submitted to him are justified or partially justified. 117 In these cases, he makes recommendations to redress the problem directly to the individual soldier’s commander. These recommendations must be complied with unless overruled by the IDF Chief of Staff.

He reports annually to the Minister of Defence and is entitled to submit special reports during the year. Special reports normally deal with investigations into systemic issues. All reports are made public.

Brig.-Gen. (ret’d) Doshen conceded that the IDF Commissioner:

[…] appears to be well liked by junior personne. Its longevity would suggest that the IDF is satisfied with it and that it effectively serves their members, even in times of hostilities. 118

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As I mentioned in the introduction to this report, Ombudsmanry is a fluid concept capable of adapting itself to the specific and particular needs of the institution it is intended to serve. The ultimate goal must be to create an effective and credible Ombudsman’s Office. To that end, I carefully examined the advantages and disadvantages of each of the models outlined above.

The focus in TOA-style ‘soft’ Organizational Ombudsmanry is to assist the client to develop, and then pursue, his or her own options to resolve problems. The onus is on the client, not the Ombudsman, to be proactive and to achieve resolution. While there is scope to use these techniques in my Office in some cases, there is, in my opinion, a fundamental flaw in adopting this blanket approach in dealing with many of the people who are seeking my Office's assistance. As noted below, the DND/CF is a unique institution. It has working conditions and cultural values, far removed from those of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology or Anheuser-Busch, two of the founding members of the TOA.119 Many of the people who have already come to us for help have already exhausted their options. Some are frightened or intimidated. We have been told repeatedly that many members perceive a widespread culture of reprisal and repression within the organization against anyone who breaks ranks. These are not fertile conditions for the limited TOA-style dispute resolution process.

Further, a pilot Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) programme under the direction of Mr. Peter Sterne, Executive Director - Conflict Management, is now being formed. It has a mandate to “assist CF members and DND employees resolve issues and complaints at the lowest possible level, before the problem becomes a formal compliant or grievance. The ADR programme will use formal mediation to resolve conflict.” 120 Mr. Sterne is currently designing a mediation process. This would leave the Ombudsman free to deal, among other things, with more systemic and serious matters in addition to supporting the use of mediation, when appropriate.

Dr. Rowe, a co-founder of the TOA, has been in the field of corporate and academic Organizational Ombudsmanry for 25 years. She states that aspects of the Canadian Organizational Ombudsman tradition are far different than the US-designed model that she represents. This is particularly the case in the academic field, where Canadian Ombudsmanry has a strong track record of employing many of the features of classical Ombudsmanry, albeit that they remain Organizational Ombudsmen in the wider sense. Dr. Rowe writes that:

[…] some organizational ombudsmen who serve the employers clients do so a manner similar to that of classical, statutory ombudspeople. That is, some client ombudspeople may on occasion look into a problem and issue a written report.121

In a telephone interview with a member of my staff, Dr. Rowe acknowledged that while the TOA model had a great deal to offer “you may have more need of a classical model”, not necessarily because of the military context, but because we were operating in Canada. She indicated that a "US-made" solution is possibly inappropriate in these circumstances.

The inadequacies of a TOA-style model quickly became apparent during the consultation process. On October 21, 1998, speakers from the “Between Us” programme gave a presentation to a group of approximately three hundred mainly senior and middle ranking DND/CF personnel at the Defence Ethics Conference held in Ottawa. Reaction from the audience, both anecdotally and in written questionnaires submitted at the conclusion of the conference, was almost universally negative. The vast majority of respondents felt that the “Between Us” model was clearly unsuitable or irrelevant in the DND/CF context. Comments ranged from the perplexed to the derisory. As one audience member wrote, “[t]he objectives of a financial institution differ significantly from those of the military”. One senior participant went even further:

Doshen was here a few years back and he was looking at setting up this Ombudsman office in Ottawa, with five people dealing with issues. This cannot work. […]. Then he proposes the Toronto Dominion model. We are not an organization dealing with simple issues. That model does not work with our reality. I saw the conference in Ottawa and they have a simple set up to listen to people and don’t tackle any issues. 122

Comments from other attendees included:

  • “Even if you want to deal with an Ombudsman process, a money making operation has very different requirements.”
  • “Don’t see the connection.”
  • “How can they deal with real issues?”
  • “They have no investigative authority - when they were discussing the setting up of the DND/CF Ombudsman, the TD Ombudsman was proposed as a model. I am relieved to see we are not going that route because we need something that is much more effective.”123

The reaction was similar when we discussed the TD-type dispute resolution process during the consultation process:

  • You can’t compare the Canadian Forces to the Toronto Dominion Bank. (Meeting with Senior NCMs, CFB Trenton, September 8, 1998)
  • [A] corporate model like TD Ombudsman won’t work, the difference between us and a corporation is the chain of command. (Meeting with Officers, CFB Gagetown, October 29, 1998)
  • I've been through touchy-feely…no thanks. You can’t compare managerial and command systems. (Telephone interview, RCA Officer, December 15, 1998)

Even the use of the name “Ombudsman” by “soft” model practitioners has been the subject of sometimes heated debate in the field. There is considerable disagreement as to whether Organizational Ombudsmen who limit themselves to the ten functions: listening/venting; providing information; reframing issues/developing options, referring, advice/coaching, looking into a problem, formal mediation, propose changes to policies and practices, monitoring and upward referral of trends, actually qualify to use the name “Ombudsman”. Some Ombudsmen who have powers to investigate have adopted the term “real Ombudsmen” when comparing themselves to the TOA model. A paper to the American Bar Association in 1997 was entitled “American Ombudsmen and others; or, American Ombudsmen and “Wannabe” Ombudsmen.” The author argues that, while the TOA model has some merit, it is not Ombudsmanry in any real sense of the word, rather a “thinly disguised alternative dispute resolution mechanism without the powers needed to be effective Ombudsmen”.124

Interestingly, in 1991, the government of New Zealand passed legislation prohibiting any institution or business using the name “Ombudsman” unless approved. The reasons it did so were articulated by Mr. John Robertson, the Chief Ombudsman of New Zealand and President of the International Ombudsman Institute, who stated:

For some twenty years the word (Ombudsman) in New Zealand was synonymous with an independent parliamentary officer to whom citizens could turn for help in resolving their grievances with the bureaucracy. However, in a sense, therein lay the trap. The word became a symbol which conveyed a sense of fair play and justice in the resolution of grievances, and was seized upon overseas, and particularly in North America, by private sector consumer interest groups for a myriad of consumer grievance procedures. I became concerned at the potentially adverse effects which proliferation of the term Ombudsman for a wide variety of grievance procedures might have on the status and integrity of the Parliamentary Ombudsman in New Zealand […] The value of the office of the Ombudsman to the public should not be diminished by unnecessary confusion as to what an Ombudsman is or does. 125 (Emphasis added)

The Chief Ombudsman of New Zealand, to whom the authority to grant permission was delegated, wrote that “[a]s a general rule, an Ombudsman scheme will only be granted the use of the name Ombudsman if it is independent, accessible, fair and effective.” (emphasis added) To qualify to use the name an organization must ensure that, inter alia, the Ombudsman has the capacity to:

[…] receive complaints directly from a complainant, free of charge; investigate the facts impartially; conclude with a decision to sustain or not sustain; and, if appropriate, achieve a remedy. The position will need to be seen to be independent and impartial by both the consumer and the organization to ensure maximum effectiveness and influence. 126 (emphasis added)

In May 1994, the British and Irish Ombudsman Association (BIOA) issued guidelines for the use of the word Ombudsman. The reasons they did so are undoubtedly similar to those voiced by the Chief Ombudsman of New Zealand. They determined that:

[…] the term “Ombudsman” should only be used if four key criteria are met. These criteria are: independence of the Ombudsman from those whom the Ombudsman has the power to investigate; effectiveness; fairness and public accountability.127

When examining the various organizations and models, I was particularly attracted to an argument advanced by Dr. Patrick Robardet, Director of Legal Affairs and Research, Office of the Québec Ombudsman. He writes that military Ombudsmen fall into the category of public sector “Specialty Ombudsmen”, which he defines as an Ombudsman who “intervenes only in specific areas of government activity or regarding limited categories of complaints or complainants.” 128 However, according to Dr. Robardet, there are “fundamental principles [that] unify all [Ombudsmen] offices and that there exists a core of functions and criteria for effectiveness, common to all offices.” He identifies these as independence, accessibility, credibility and flexibility. He continues that:

[…] in spite of this common core, a new office has to be made to measure, it cannot be imported wholesale or bought off the peg. In addition, Ombudsmanship […] remains a fluid craft. 129 (Emphasis added)

I agree. DND/CF is a unique organization with unique needs. As the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) Ombudsman pointed out during the consultation process, the DND/CF is virtually a government within a government, with its own code of discipline, health care system, infrastructure, policing and judicial system. 130 Its employees are subject to terms and conditions of employment far removed from, and far more onerous than, those experienced by most others within or without of government. The DND/CF personnel are members of an organization that has the capacity to impinge upon almost every aspect of their lives, including those times when they are not on duty.

The tools and powers available to the DFAIT, DIAND or CIDA Ombudsman, who, between them, deal with less than 460 “contacts” per year, are grossly insufficient to meet the needs of this Office. For example, we cannot conceivably manage an effective operation by shredding notes and keeping no records. Additionally, and as discussed elsewhere in this report, TOA-style ombudsmanry is not an appropriate approach to deal effectively with systemic issues, which form a very important part of my mandate.

As was so evident at the Defence Ethics Conference, and throughout the consultation process, an Organizational Ombudsman modeled solely along the TOA Organizational Ombudsman model will have no credibility virtually anywhere within the DND/CF, or, ultimately, with the public. One of the reasons this Office was created was “to send a strong signal to members that the organization cares about individuals.” 131 It became very clear during the consultation that a TOA-type Ombudsman model will not convey that message, and, because of its inherent powerlessness, may indeed produce the opposite effect. While I anticipate that many of the tenets of TOA-style ombudsmanry will be indispensable in resolving problems at a low level, this approach alone is not sufficient, in and of itself, to provide the foundation of a viable office.

We found no examples of military Ombudsmen who had adopted the TOA Organizational Ombudsman approach, most likely because it is clearly so unsuitable for a military environment. We also contacted staff at NDHQ who advised us that they were not aware of the existence of a “soft” approach military Ombudsman office anywhere in the world. 132 When I met with the Israeli Defence Force Soldiers Commissioner, I asked him about mediation. He stated that he is not often a mediator. The head of his legal department, Colonel Stern, stated that:

[…]sometimes when soldiers complain to us about his commanding officer we mediate and try to settle at this point. This is very rare and not what we do. It’s nice to be soft, if the two parties are of equal power; otherwise it's not very good. It does not work. Mediation would only be used if there is no cause for investigation. Investigative powers are very important.133

Ultimately, I believe that we need to build an Ombudsman's Office tailored to the requirements of the unique organization we oversee. To do that means we must incorporate many of the features from the empowered organizational and classical Ombudsmen fields. The issue of which category we fall under may be more of an academic exercise. In my view, all that matters is that the Office has the tools to be effective and credible from the outset, subject, of course, to the initial public policy parameters you have set.


42. The Ombudsman’s Association (TOA), Ombudsman 101 Course material, Table 1.

43. J.D. Love et al., Report of the Committee on the Concept of the Ombudsman, Government of Canada, Ottawa 1977.

44. Ombudsman Act Bill C-43 (April 5, 1978), 3rd Session, 30 Legislature, 26-27 Elizabeth II, 1977-1978.

45. Commissioner of Official Languages, Annual Report, 1996.

46. The Ombudsman Association, supra, note 42.

47. These are the “10 points”, quoted in TOA literature and in some of the material prepared by NDHQ during the set up phase of the Office.

48. The Ombudsman Association, supra, note 42.

49. Mary Rowe, Ph.D., Options, Functions and Skills: What an Organizational Ombudsperson Might Want to Know, A publication of The Ombudsman Association, Dallas, Texas, 1995.

50. Presentation at The Ombudsman Association (TOA) Ombudsman’s 101 Course, October 21 to 23 , 1998.

51. TOA Ombudsman Handbook, Chapter 4-4.

52. For example, see the Doshen Paper # 1, supra, note 19. The TD Bank “Between Us” programme was the only example of an organizational Ombudsman discussed in the Doshen Paper #1.

53. Meeting with "Between Us" representatives, August 14, 1998.

54. Bank of Nova Scotia, The Staff Ombuds Office: Human Resources Policies, s. 5.2.

55. Meeting with Bank of Nova Scotia Ombudsman at TOA 101 Course, October 26, 1998, and a telephone interview by a member of my staff, January 6, 1999.

56. Meeting with Ms. Isabelle Massip, DFAIT Ombudsman, August 18, 1998.

57. Meeting with Mr. J.P. Bolduc, CIDA Ombudsman, December 7, 1998.

58. In fact, some TOA-style Ombudsmen describe themselves as “facilitators”, “work problems counsellors”, “listeners”, “ombuddy”, or in similar terms, rather than "Ombudsmen" per se. Others describe people who complain to them as “visitors”, “clients”, “inquirers”, or simply “people in contact with the office”.

59. Several were at the 1998 TOA Ombudsman 101 Course, including representatives from the Los Angeles Police Department and the Nuclear Safety Concerns office of the Southern California Edison Company.

60. Concordia University, Terms of Reference for the Ombuds Office.

61. Ibid.

62. Other than issues involving the interpretation or application of a collective agreement.

63. CBC has two Ombudsmen, one for French and one for English language programming. We met with Mr. David Bazay, the English language Ombudsman and M. Marcel Pépin, the French language Ombudsman.

64. Meeting with Mr. Bazay, CBC Ombudsman, September 9, 1998.

65. David Nitkin, Corporate Ombudsman Functions in Canada, The Corporate Ethics Monitor, Vol. 10, Issue 5, September-October 1998 at page 77.

66. Telephone interview with Mr. Don Sellars, Toronto Star Ombud, by a member of my staff, December 8, 1998.

67. Canadian Banking Ombudsman, Annual Report 1997 at page 10.

68. Ibid.

69. The Bank of Nova Scotia also has an Ombudsman who deals with customer issues. He has powers similar to the Toronto Dominion Bank Ombudsman.

70. Research notes supplied by the Association of Canadian College and University Ombudspersons (ACCUO) indicates that one of the primary functions of their members is “[…] to investigate complaints of unfair treatment in an impartial and objective manner”. An informal survey of the mandates of these institutions, conducted by the ACCUO president, indicates that by far the most common power amongst the group was that of the ability to investigate issues brought to their attention.

71. The Correctional Investigator: Overview of the Mandate and Operations at page 1, presented at meeting with Mr. Ron Stewart, Correctional Investigator, December 16, 1998.

72. Corrections and Conditional Release Act, R.S.C. 1992, c. 20 (hereinafter, the CCRA).

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid. at page 2.

75. Correctional and Conditional Release Act, supra, note 72, s. 192 and s. 193.

76. The Correctional Investigator: Overview of Mandate and Operations, supra, note 71 at page 1.

77. Correctional and Conditional Release Act, supra, note 72, s. 167(1).

78. The Correctional Investigator: Overview of Mandate and Operations, supra, note 71 at pages 7-8.

79. Ibid. at page 7 and confirmed during a meeting with Mr. Ron Stewart, Correctional Investigator December 16, 1998.

80. The Correctional Investigator: Overview of Mandate and Operations, supra, note 71 at page 3. See also Corrections and Conditional Release Act, supra, note 72 , s. 171 through to s. 174.

81. Ibid. at page 8 and confirmed during a meeting with Mr. Ron Stewart, Correctional Investigator December 16, 1998.

82. Towards a Just, Peaceful and Safe Society, The Corrections and Conditional Release Act Five Years Later, Report on Consultations, Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada, 1998 at pages 45-46.

83. Department of Defense, Office of the US Inspector General, Mission Statement.

84. Information supplied by Assistant US DoD IG Mr. Robert Lieberman at a meeting on September 25, 1998.

85. Assistant US DoD IG Mr. Robert Lieberman advised that the US DoD IG investigates 400 senior officials per year. Complaints are substantiated in about 10 to 15 percent of cases.

86. The Doshen Paper #1, supra, note 19 at pages H-1 to H-5.

87. As noted above, these are normally passed on to US DoD IG for investigation.

88. Quoted in the Doshen Paper #1, supra, note 19 at pages 41 and H-1 – H-5. Some of this information came from a briefing given to members of my staff by two military members at CFB Petawawa on November 23, 1998. Both had recently attended the three-week IG course at Fort Belvoir, VA.

89. Karl Gluemes, The Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces: Her Role in Exercising Parliamentary control over the Federal Armed Forces and Processing Petitions from Service Personnel, document provided to my Office by the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1997 (revised).

90. The Doshen Paper #1, supra, note 19 at pages E-1 to E-6.

91. For description of powers see Act in Respect of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the German Armed Forces (last amended March 30, 1990).

92. The Doshen Paper #1, supra, note 19 at pages E-1 to E-6.

93. Much of this section is extracted from a letter to Lt.-Col. Pellicano (DPCR) from Col. Westwood, Director, Complaint Resolution Agency, Australian Department of Defence, dated November 2, 1998. Information was also obtained directly from a telephone interview with Ms. Susan Matthews, Director of Investigations, Australian Commonwealth Ombudsman, by a member of my staff, December 16, 1998, and from the Commonwealth Ombudsman’s 1997-1998 Annual Report.

94. Ibid. at page 112.

95. Ibid. at page 113.

96. However, the Australian Federal Attorney General can serve the Ombudsman with a certificate preventing the Ombudsman from requiring a person to furnish information concerning a matter under investigation by the Ombudsman.

97. Ombudsman’s Office Interviews with Commonwealth Officials, A paper prepared by the Ombudsman outlining guidelines for interviews with ADF officers at page C-2.

98. Telephone interview with Ms. Susan Matthews, Director of Investigations, Australian Commonwealth Ombudsman, by a member of my staff, December 16, 1998.

99. Inquiries and Investigations by the Commonwealth Ombudsman and the Defence Force Ombudsman Affecting the Department of Defence and the Australian Defence Force, background materials provided to my Office, paras. 7 and 8.

100. Ibid. at paras. 17 and 19.

101. The Doshen Paper #1, supra, note 19 at page D-8.

102. Commonwealth Ombudsman Annual Report 1997-98, supra, note 93 at page 11.

103. All of the information in this section is extracted from a document entitled “The Ombudsman for the Armed Forces – The Committee of the Ombudsman of the Armed Forces”, supplied to us by Lieutenant-Commander Christian Nordanger of the Office of the Defence Attaché, Royal Norwegian Embassy, Washington, D.C.

104. Ibid.

105. Ibid.

106. Ibid.

107. A Benchmark Study of the Armed Forces of Australia, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Canada, Report to the Prime Minister, March 1997 at page 31.

108. Meeting with Czech Republic Armed Forces Ombudsman, Mr. Vladimir Tetur in Montréal, December 7, 1998.

109. The Function of the Inspector General of the Dutch Armed Forces, November 1998, document provided by Lieutenant-Kolonel Plugge, Inspector General of the Netherlands. See also: The Doshen Paper #1, supra, note 19 at pages G-1 to G-5.

110. Presentation material supplied to my Office by the office of Inspector General of the Dutch Armed Forces.

111. Inspector General of the Armed Forces(Netherlands), Material provided to my Office, Duties at page 3.

112. The office is also known as the Soldiers' Rights Commission.

113. The current Soldiers' Complaints Commissioner is Brig.-Gen. (ret’d) Uzi Levtzur. I met with him on November 9, 1998 during the Consultation process.

114. Military Justice Law (Israel) Part II, 1972, Clause 551. The legislation governing the office stipulates that the Soldiers Commissioner “is entitled to investigate the complaint in any manner he deems, and is not bound to procedural law or to rules of evidence.” He may enter any IDF premises at any time to conduct his investigations.

115. The Doshen Paper #1, supra, note 19 at pages F-1 to F-5.

116. Soldiers' Complaints Commissioner's Office: Excerpts from the Annual Report (1997).

117. Ibid.

118. Ibid. at page F-3.

119. Other founding members include Wharton School of Business and Polaroid.

120. A Commitment to Change: Report on Recommendations on the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, supra, note 39 at page 16.

121. Options, Functions and Skills: What an Organizational Ombudsperson Might Want to Know, supra, note 49 at page 3.

122. Meeting with Senior Military and Civilian Personnel, CFB Halifax, October 26, 1998.

123. All the above comments are responses to a written questionnaire submitted at the conclusion of the Defence Ethics Conference held in Ottawa, October 20 and 21, 1998.

124. Larry B. Hill, American Ombudsmen and Others; or, American Ombudsmen and Wannabe Ombudsmen, Address delivered at the 1997 spring meeting of the American Bar Association, April 18, 1997. Professor Hill stated that “[…] my overall conclusion is, however, that organizational Ombudsmen’s offices are simply mediators. Real Ombudsmen are not, however, generally described as mediators. Although they might sometimes perform some functions as mediators, Ombudsmen are institutions that are involved in doing impartial investigations of citizens’ complaints.”

125. John F. Robertson, Protection of the Name “Ombudsman”: Occasional Paper #48, International Ombudsman Institute, February 1993.

126. Essential Characteristics of a Classical Ombudsman, supra, note 10 at page 15, para. 3. The authors also state at page 9 that “[t]he Ombudsman is an independent governmental official who receives complaints against government agencies and officials from aggrieved persons, who investigates, and who, if the complaints are justified, makes recommendations to remedy the complaints.” This is similar to the American Bar Association definition of an Ombudsman.

127. Ibid. at page 12. The authors state that according to the BIOA an Ombudsman should “[b]e entitled to investigate any complaint made to the Ombudsman which is within the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction without the need for any prior consent of the person or body against whom the complaint is made.”

128. Setting Up An Ombudsman Office: A Checklist (Basic Principles, Statutory Provisions, Organization and Practices), supra, note 2 at page 3.

129. Ibid.

130. Meeting with Mr. J.P. Bolduc, CIDA Ombudsman, December 7, 1998.

131. Briefing Note for the DND Deputy Minister, February 12, 1997 at page 3.

132. Various conversations with the DND/CF Executive Director - Conflict Management and Director Personnel Complaints Resolution staff.

133. Meeting with IDF Soldiers' Complaint Commissioner, November 9, 1998.

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